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rules of law. Futhermore, the tort approach to liability for breach of
warranty is as logically sound as the contract approach.
It would appear that the preoccupation with contract in connection with warranty has no sound basis. The action for breach of
warranty was for hundreds of years a tort action. It seems that the
change from tort to contract was due only to the fact that most of
the cases which arose involved contracts. 34 There is still substantial
recognition of the original tort theory, and a return to it is still possible when the courts are willing to decide that the manufacturer has
a duty toward all those who use his products. 35
ROBERT FRANK

SPOT ZONING APPROVED IN NEW YORK
With the rising population and the growth of cities that is so
characteristic of present society, zoning boards and city officials are
faced with difficult problems. When the character of an area changes
because of population growth, location of a new superhighway, or
a similar reason, this necessitates a revision in the zoning plan for
that area.
Traditionally city planners have zoned by dividing a city into
separate areas, each zoned for a particular use.' Once an area has been
zoned, buildings designed for a different purpose cannot be constructed in the area, nor can existing property be converted to a
different use than the type specified. 2 Any change in the use of a
piece of property within a zoned area requires an amendment to the
zoning ordinance,3 which may be difficult to justify because of the
likelihood that such a change will be illegal "spot zoning."4
"Prosser, Torts 507 (2d ed.

1955).

h1bid.

'Devaney v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 132 Conn. 537, 45 A.2d 828 (1946);
Elizabeth City v. Avdlett, 201 N.C. 602, 161 S.E. 78 (193i); Blankenship v. City of
Richmond, 18 Va. 97, 49 S.E.2d 321 (1948). For a collection of cases see iot C.J.S.
Zoning § (ig58).
2
Heath v. Mayor and City Council, 188 Md. 296, 49 A.2d 799 (1946); Collins v.
Board of Adjustment, 3 N.J. 200, 69 A.2d 708 (949); Schleck v. Zoning Bd.
of Appeals, 354 Wis. 42, 35 N.W.2d 312 (1948). For a collection of cases see ioi CJ.S.
Zoning § 1 (1958).
38 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.o6 (1949).
4
Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice §§ 9o-95 (1953). The term "spot zoning" describes an amendment to a zoning ordinance that reclassifies a small area for a use
prohibited by the original zoning ordinance and out of harmony therewith. Id. at
§ 90.
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A new approach to zoning was ruled upon by the New York Court
of Appeals in Church v. Town of Islip.5 The town of Islip was in an
area of rapidly increasing population. An application was made to
the town board for a zoning change of a lot from a residential to a
business classification. Indications were that the area in which the
zoning change was requested eventually would be zoned for business.
The town board had three alternatives: (i) to reject the application;
(2) to rezone the entire area; (3)to grant the application and rezone
the single lot.
The town board chose the third alternative and rezoned the one
lot for business. As conditions to the.zoning change the town board
required that the building cover no more than 25 per cent of the
area of the lot and that an anchor fence with shrubbery be constructed and maintained within the boundary line of the lot.6 The
plaintiffs, residents of the affected area, sought to have the zoning
change ruled unconstitutional on the ground that this change was
illegal either as "contract zoning" 7 or "spot zoning." These contentions
were rejected by the trial court, and the decision was affirmed by the
New York Court of Appeals.8
The contention that the zoning change was invalid as "contract
zoning" was based upon the proposition that such a change requiring
the acceptance of restrictions is a bargaining away of the town's police
power. The police power is not subject to limitation by private contract; 9 thus any contract based on a limitation of the town's police power would be invalid.10 In Baylis v. City of Baltimore," for
example, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled a zoning ordinance
invalid, stating that "the resulting contract is nugatory because a
municipality is not able to make agreements which inhibit its police
powers .... 12
Although New York accepts the rule that a government body can'8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 68o (196o).
OId. at 681.
7
"Contract zoning" is the term applied when a consideration is given for the
zoning change. Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959).
'8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 68o, 683 (196o).
9Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908); Northern Pac.

Ry. v. Duluth, 208 U.S. 583 (i9o8); 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 24.20
(1949).
"Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md.
164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959); Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Prod. Credit Ass'n,
9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319 (1952).
"219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959).

1Id. at 433.
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not bargain away its police powers, 13 the Court of Appeals refused to
draw the analogy between zoning with special restrictions and contracting away police power.' 4 The town board presumably could have
zoned the corner for business or any other use.' 5 Also the town board
could have imposed reasonable restrictions in the different zone classifications.' 6 Thus, it seems to follow that the board can create a new
classification embodying the particular restrictions placed on the
property in the Church case. Therefore the Court of Appeals properly rejected the argument that there was a contracting away of the
town's police power and examined the more serious question of
17
whether the zoning ordinance was illegal "spot zoning."'
It is generally agreed that "spot zoning" is an undesirable practice. s However, there is a distinction between illegal "spot zoning"
and a valid zoning change that is limited to a small area.' 9 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland drew the distinction in this way:
"If it is an arbitrary and unreasonable devotion of the small
area to a use inconsistent with the uses to which the rest of the
district is restricted and made for the sole benefit of the private
interests of the owner, it is invalid .... On the other hand,
if the zoning of the small parcel is in accord and in harmony
with the comprehensive zoning plan and is done for the public
good... it is valid. '' 20
The test set forth by the Maryland court has been widely accepted,2 ' but the cases that apply the test are difficult to reconcile. In
recent decisions the courts have held invalid the rezoning of a residential lot for a post office, 22 a seaside residential area for commercial
fishing,23 and a small area on one side of an expressway for business
3

" Atlantic Beach Property Owners' Ass'n v. Town of Hempstead, 3 N.Y.2d 434,
i.t4 N.E.2d 409, 165 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1957); Wells v. Village of E. Aurora, 236 App. Div.
474, 259 N.Y.S. 598 (4 th Dep't 1932); Schwab v. Graves, 221 App. Div. 357, 223 N.YS.

i6o (4 th Dep't 1927).
"18 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 68o, 683 (1960).
2-N.Y. Town Law §§ 261-62 (1957).
26Ibid.
"Two judges dissented on this point. 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 68o, 683 (196o).
131 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 9o (1953).
13
oi C.J.S. Zoning § 33 (1958); 1 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 91 (1953).
13
Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83, 88 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
aZachring v. Township of Long Beach, 56 N.J. Super. 26, 151 A.2d 425 (Super.
Ct. 1959); Rogers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951);
D'Angelo v. Knights of Columbus Bldg. Ass'n, 151 A.2d 495 (R.I. 1959); 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.84 (1957).
22D'Angelo v. Knights of Columbus Bldg. Ass'n, 151 A.2d 495 (R.I. 1959).
23Zachring v..Township of Long Beach, 56 N.J. Super. 26, 151 A.2d 425 (Super.
Ct. 1959).
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24
even though the other side had already been zoned for business.
In these cases the courts have stressed the fact that a comprehensive
zoning plan contemplates fixed areas within- defined boundaries.
Other courts have upheld zoning changes in the classification of a
small area, when an expressway changed the nature of the property, 25
and when an area's population had increased rapidly, thereby changing the surrounding neighborhood or creating a need for business
property. 26 In these cases the courts have pointed out that it is only
necessary for a comprehensive plan to be a general one and not a detailed plan to control development of property, and that a change
may be in accordance with a comprehensive plan, even though there
is not exact compliance with every detail of the plan. Basically, the
requirement of a comprehensive plan is that it be something more
than a piecemeal approach. 27 Zoning looks to a stable, not a static,
28
community.
The real problem in the Church case was whether the zoning
change was in accordance with a comprehensive plan. Prior to the
Church decision, the leading case in New York was Rogers v. Village
of Tarrytown,29 which upheld an ordinance giving a village planning
board the power to reclassify any ten acre tract within a one and twofamily dwelling zone into a multiple-family dwelling zone. 30 Under
this ordinance the planning board was authorized to accept or reject
applications for reclassification upon the merits of the particular situation. This resulted in small areas being zoned for multiple-family
dwellings within a larger area of one or two-family dwellings, but the
court held that the ordinance met the requirements of a comprehensive plan.31
The principal case goes beyond the Rogers decision since the town
of Tarrytown had an ordinance to serve as a guide in making zoning
changes, but the town of Islip had no such ordinance. The result
of the Church case is that it is only necessary for the plan to ex24

Hewitt v. County Comm'r, 220 Md. 82, 151 A.2d 144 (1959).

2Ball v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 397, 151 A.2d 327 (1959).
2
'Clark v. Town Council, 145 Conn. 476, 144 A.2d 327 (1958); Fifteen Fifty No.
State Bldg. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 15 Ill. 2d 408, 155 N.E-2d 97 (1959); Bartlett
v. Township of Middletown, 51 N.J Super. 239, 143 A.2d 778 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1958).
-'Pecora v. Zoning Comm'n, 145 Conn. 435, 144 A.2d 48, 52 (1958); Clark v. Town
-

Council, 145 Conn. 476, 144 A.2d 327, 333 (1958)
.
2'Bartlett v. Township of Middletown, 51 N.J. Super, 239, 143 A.2d 778, 791

(Super Ct. App. Div. 1958).
"3o2 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).

M'Id. at 736.
3Id. at 735.
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ist in the minds of the zoning board. The test of the validity of a
zoning change would now seem to be whether the zoning board sought
to achieve a legitimate end by reasonable means.
The greatest danger involved in zoning is that "spot zoning" will
be used to favor a particular individual at the expense of neighboring
property owners.32 It was the recognition of this danger by the
courts that led to imposing the requirement of a comprehensive
zoning plan to guide the zoning board, and the requirement of uniformity of regulations throughout each district. These safeguards
have been seriously weakened, if not abolished, by the instant case.
Under the doctrine of the Church case, however, zoning boards
are better prepared to solve the more complicated problems of rapid
urbanization. In Islip a reclassification of the entire area would have
met the tests of older zoning authorities but it would have brought
disorder and hardship to many property owners. A refusal to make
any zoning change in an area subject to forces calling for a change
hinders normal development and brings economic loss to property
owners. Under the circumstances the most practical approach is
the one which the court adopted-piecemeal zoning based on individual situations with restrictions protecting the neighboring property
owners. In this way the problems involved in rezoning can be held
to a minimum. The practical advantages of the Islip approach outweigh the theoretical dangers inherent in the increased power given
the town board.
While no other decision has gone as far as the principal case, recent decisions in Connecticut indicate that strict compliance with
a comprehensive plan is not necessary.3 3 The Supreme Court of
Illinois sustained a single lot zoning change in order to permit a
twenty-five story building to be built.34 The chief argument used

by the Supreme Court of Illinois to justify this change was that the
area was in a state of transition. 35 In light of these developments
there is reason to believe that other courts will give serious consideration to the New York approach.
WILLIAM

28

T.

KING

McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.42 (949).

'Pecora v. Zoning Comm'n, 145 Conn. 435, x44 A.2d 48 (1958); Wade v. Town

Plan &Zoning Comm'n, 145 Conn.

592, 145

A.2d 597 (1958).

"1Fifteen Fifty No. State Bldg. Corp. v. City of Chicago,
N.E.2d 97 (1959)nId. at I2.

15

I1. 2d 408,
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